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1 Introduction
An economy consists of agents: rms, consumers, governments, etc. . . , endowed with
interests, abilities, and information who interact in real time. These agents behave in
response to their incentive structures subject to certain constraints. The importance of
incentives and the ability of human actors to adapt their behavior { to change their deci-
sions or decision making rules { distinguishes social systems from physical systems. This
paper demonstrates how the interplay between incentives and the timing of updating
can alter ndings signicantly in economic models with neighborhood eects. The anal-
ysis considers cellular automata models in which the timing of updating is varied from
synchronous, to random asynchronous, to incentive based asynchronous. Signicant and
interesting dierences in the dynamics and steady states are found and explained under
each updating rule.
Cellular automata are unfamiliar to many economists. Some background infor-
mation helps to place the ndings in context. Cellular automata (CA) are dynamical
systems dened on lattices in which time, states, and spatial relationships are discrete.
The state of each cell on the lattice updates at each time step according to a local rule.
This local rule depends not only on the current state of the cell but also on the states of
cells in a neighborhood around the cell. Cellular automata provide a simple, adaptable
framework in which to analyze complex dynamical systems. Even one dimensional cel-
lular automata can exhibit a wide range of dynamic behavior including chaos (Wolfram
1992). The potential impact of cellular automata on economics is not insignicant. Cellu-
lar automata allow for models in which economic and social behavior occur through local
interactions including models in which economic agents possess only localized knowledge
of prices and opportunities. One implication of an agent based modeling perspective is
that ineciences may persist in an economy (Tesfatsion 1994).
CAs can be used to model many physical, biological, and social systems. Recently,
there has been work on extending CAs to allow for a continuum of states and continuous
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In the latter research agenda, the assumption of the discrete synchronous clock
has come under scrutiny. Huberman and Glance (1993) re-analyze Nowak and May's
(1992) model of the prisoner's dilemma being played on a cellular automata using random
asynchronous updating. In random asynchronous updating, cells are ordered randomly,
and they update their states sequentially in that order. Huberman and Glance nd
that the interesting patterns exhibited in Nowak and May's work disappeared when the
updating of cells became asynchronous. More generally, Chate and Manneville (1991)
state that \some of the apparent self{organization in cellular automata is an artifact
of the synchronization of clocks," and Bersini and Detours (1994) in analyzing modied
versions of the game of life and the immune network model nd that random asynchronous
updating induces stability rather than long transients.
Random asynchronous updating picks cells at random and updates their states.
In a model of a physical system, this may be an appropriate assumption. Yet, this is
just one of many possible asynchronous updating schedules. For the purposes of elabo-
ration, consider a one dimensional circular lattice where each cell represents an economic
actor and each state represents a strategy. Many types of asynchronous updating can
be imagined in this arrangement. The sequencing could be based on geography: the
agent located at twelve-o-clock might update rst with the updating proceeding either
clockwise or counter{clockwise. The sequence might be state based: those agents in state
 might update rst. Such an assumption would make sense if some states have greater
exibility and require less time to change. The sequence might even be determined by a
function of both location and state. Any deterministic or biased sequencing is possible.
The modelling challenge is to choose the updating sequence which best applies to the
phenomenon being studied.
In economic contexts, the order of sequencing might depend on the incentives to
updating. This can formalized as an incentive based asynchronous updating rule. The
agents (cells) who benet most from changing their states update rst. To determine
which agents benet most, entails extrapolating from the local updating rule and impute
a utility function. The order in which agents update can be determined by the agents'
relative increases in utility from state changes. The idea that those who benet most
by updating change states earliest accords with reality: all other eects being equal, the
rst people in line for general admission concert tickets most want to attend, and the
people with the most exciting evening plans leave work earliest. Such an assumption is
also defensible on theoretical grounds with strategic agents, but the focus here is on CA
models in which the automata follow rules rather than act strategically.
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To gain insight into incentive based asynchronous updating matters, two models,
the game of life and the conformity CA, are analyzed. The game of life (Berkelamp, Con-
way, and Guy 1982) has generated widespread interest among professional and amateur
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When the cell state space is continuous, the system is called a a bi-coupled lattice. See Bell (1994)
for an example of a bi{coupled lattice in an economic context. An advantage of the bi{coupled lattice
is that states can update synchronously but at dierent rates which can be interpreted as measuring
dierent incentives to update.
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An interesting research question arises if a CA model is contemplated from a game theoretic per-
spective. This could be accomplished by letting the per period payo at a site equal one if the cell is in
the correct state and zero if is not.
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scientists for decades. Its popularity stems from its capacity to generate cyclic patterns
and long transients which can be visualized on a rectangular grid. In the game of life,
cells assume one of two states: dead or alive. Whether a cell is alive or dead depends
upon the how many of its eight immediate neighbors are alive. If the number of living
neighbors is less than two then the cell dies of starvation. If it is more than three, the
cell dies of suocation. If the number of neighbors lies between the thresholds, and the
cell is currently alive it remains so. If a cell is dead, it comes to life if exactly three of its
neighbors are living.
Modern technology has transported the game from the tiled oors of mathematics
departments to computer screens which has increase its popularity. As mentioned, the
game of life oers an ideal testbed because with synchronous updating it creates inter-
esting dynamics: patterns, cycles, and long transients as well as extreme sensitivity to
initial conditions. The patterns include gliders which oat along the grid. With random
asynchronous updating, the system quickly stabilizes and exhibits little sensitivity to ini-
tial conditions (Bersini and Detours 1994). In this paper, incentive based asynchronous
updating is shown to also induce stability. This is not surprising. What is surprising is
that it generates greater sensitivity to initial conditions than synchronous updating.
The second model, the conformity CA, generates much simpler dynamics than
the game of life. In fact, in an appendix it is shown to converge to a steady state in
nite time. Though less well known than the game of life, the conformity CA has greater
economic relevance. In the conformity CA, each cell assumes one of two states: zero {
one, Mac { IBM, or democrat { republican. Here, neighborhoods contain an odd number
of cells.
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The state of a cell at time period t + 1 is determined by majority rule over
neighboring cells: each cell assumes the state of the majority of its neighbors at time t.
Given this interpretation of the states, the conformity CA can be utilized as a model of
preference formation in which agents begin to conform to the preferences of their neigh-
bors (Brown, Pefer, and McBurnett 1993, Bell 1994). For the conformity CA, incentive
based asynchronous updating diers from synchronous and random asynchronous updat-
ing in the dynamics it generates, the distribution over steady states it induces, and in
the sensitivity to initial conditions it creates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, the
conformity CA is dened, and the updating rules are characterized formally. In section
4, an analysis of the dynamics, steady states, and sensitivity to initial conditions of the
conformity CA under the various updating rules is presented. In section 5, the game
of life is dened and analyzed, and in section 6, the idea of geographic based updating
is applied in two forms to the game of life. The discussion at the end of the paper
includes additional comments on the relevance of these results for computational theory
and discusses possible future work.
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In the conformity CA, whenever referring to a cell's neighbors, the cell itself is included in this set.
Recall that in the game of life, the cell is not included.
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2 The Conformity Cellular Automata
A cellular automata (CA)is a D-dimensional lattice with a nite state automaton at each
cell (Wolfram 1992). In this paper, attention is restricted to square two dimensional CAs
of nite width oriented as a torus. To accomplish this, the top of the lattice is connected
to the bottom and the right side connected to the left side.
Def'n The cells L = N N
At each cell, the automaton assumes a value from a nite set of states. In the two
models considered here, the cells assume only two states.
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Def'n The set of states, S = f0; 1g, the state of the automaton at cell (i; j) is denoted
by s
ij
.
The global state of a CA can also be dened.
Def'n The set of global state of the cellular automaton, S = fs : s = fs
11
; s
12
; ::::s
NN
g; s
ij
2
f0; 1g g
Each automaton's input consists of the states of the automata in a neighborhood
of the cell. For the conformity CA, square neighborhoods of various sizes are considered.
Def'n The neighborhood of size  of cell (i; j), N

(i; j) = f(
^
i;
^
j) j j i  
^
i j k and j
j  
^
j j 
A neighborhood of size one contains nine cells, while neighborhoods of size two
contain twenty ve cells. In the conformity CA, each automaton wishes to conform its
state to the state of a majority of the automata in its neighborhood.
Def'n The conformity updating rule given neighborhoods of size , C

: N  N  S !
f0; 1g according to the following rules:
C

(i; j; s) = 0 if
X
(k;l)2N

(i;j)
s
kl
<
(2 + 1)
2
2
C

(i; j; s) = 1 if
X
(k;l)2N

(i;j)
s
kl
>
(2 + 1)
2
2
The gure below shows a neighborhood of size one. Including the cell itself, there
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Hereafter, the state of an automaton at a particular cell shall be referred to as the cell's state.
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are a total of nine cells. According to the conformity rule, if ve or more cells' neighbors
assume the state 1 (denoted by a lled in circle), as is the case here, then the cell in the
center should also be in state 1. In the gure below, the center cell is in state 0, the
incorrect state prior to updating and in the correct state after updating.
Before After
iyy iyy
yiy yyy
yyi yyi
3 Updating Rules
The synchronous, random asynchronous, and incentive based asynchronous updating rules
can now be dened. Let s
t
denote the global state of the CA at time t, and let C denote
the space of all possible local updating rules.
Def'n Given C 2 C and s
0
2 S, the synchronous updating rule SY : S  C ! S as
follows:
1. s
t+1
i;j
= C(i; j; s
t
) for all (i; j)
Def'nGiven C 2 C and s
0
2 S, the random asynchronous updating rule ASY : SC ! S
as follows:
1. Let s

= s
t
2. For i = 1 to N N do
(a) Randomly choose (i; j)
(b) Let s

ij
= C(i; j; s

)
3. s
t+1
i;j
= s

i;j
for all (i; j)
To dene incentive based asynchronous updating requires extrapolating a `utility
from updating' function from the local updating rule. This is the gain in utility that a
cell obtains from changing its state. In the conformity CA, a cell wants to conform to be
like its surrounding cells. If a majority of the surrounding cells are in a dierent state
than the cell, the cell wishes to change to the other state. A natural assumption is that
the more neighboring cells that are in the opposite state, the more the cell wishes to
change. The largest utility increases would occur if all of a cell's neighbors were in the
opposite state of the cell.
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This rule can be formalized as follows:
5
Jonathon Bendor has suggested allowing the order to be determined by the utility dierences between
cells. In the case of the conformity CA, these rules would have similar characteristics
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Def'n Given  the utility from updating function for the conformity CA, U

: N N 
S ! R as follows:
U

(i; j; s) =
0
@
(2+ 1)
2
2
 
X
(k;l)2N

(i;j)
s
kl
1
A
 (s
ij
  C

(i; j; s))
Suppose that  = 1, so that each cell has nine cells in its neighborhood. The rst
term in the brackets equals the dierence between 4:5 and the number of neighbors that
have value one. The second term equals zero if the cell's state would not change during
updating, and plus or minus one (depending upon whether it should update to 0 or 1) if
the cell's state would change. Thus, if a cell currently has six neighbors in state 1 (as in
the gure at the end of the previous section) and is in state 0, then it receives a utility
from updating equal to 1:5. Incentive based asynchronous updating can now be dened.
Def'n Given C 2 C and s
0
2 S, the incentive based asynchronous updating rule IBA :
S  C ! S as follows:
1. Let s

= s
t
2. For i = 1 to N N do
(a) Compute U

(i; j; s) for all (i; j)
(b) Choose (
^
i;
^
j) 2 f (i; j) : U

(i; j; s)  U

(i
0
; j
0
; s) for all (i
0
; j0)g
(c) Let s

^
i
^
j
= C(
^
i;
^
j; s

)
3. s
t+1
i;j
= s

i;j
for all (i; j)
In incentive based asynchronous updating, a random cell from among those cells
which have the highest utility from updating is selected to be updated.
4 Computational Analysis of the Conformity CA
In order to compare the outcomes of the conformity rule under various updating rules,
some additional characteristics of CA must be dened. A global state is said to be stable
with respect to the conformity map if it is a xed point of the conformity map applied to
each cell.
Def'n A global state, s = fs
11
; s
12
; ::::s
NN
g, is stable with respect to C

if s
ij
= C

(i; j; s)
for all (i; j).
The set of steady states is identical for synchronous, random asynchronous, and
incentive based asynchronous updating because the local updating rule is the same for
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each. This does not imply that given an initial conguration they will lead to the same
steady state, nor does it imply that given a distribution over initial congurations that
they will generate similar distributions over steady states.
The steady states do vary with , the neighborhood size. For example, gure one
shows a global state which is stable with respect to the conformity map given neighbor-
hoods of size one, and gure two shows a global state which is stable with respect to the
conformity map given neighborhoods of size three.
Place gures one and two here
A distinguishing feature between these two global states is that the second consists
of larger \chunks" of automatons in identical states. To capture this feature of CAs a
measure of linear disparity is introduced. Linear disparity equals the average number of
times the state changes on average in each row of the cellular automata.
Def'n The linear disparity, D, of a global state, G = fs
11
; s
12
; ::::s
NN
g, is dened as
follows:
D(G) =
1
N
N
X
i=1
(j s
iN
  s
i1
j +
N 1
X
j=1
j s
ij
  s
i(j+1)
j)
The extent to which the various updating rules alter the sensitivity to initial
conditions is also of interest. There are several ways to measure sensitivity to initial con-
ditions. The approach followed by Browne, Pefer, and McBurnett (1992) is to generate
a time series of the average state of the cellular automata and to compute the Lyapunov
exponent. A statistical test of the Lyapunov exponent then allows the determination
of the likelihood that the underlying process is chaotic. A simpler, equally compelling
measure of the sensitivity to initial conditions is to ask how much the equilibrium global
state changes when a small change is made in the initial global state. Therefore, the
measure of sensitivity to initial conditions employed is constructed as follows: change
the state of one, two, three, or four randomly chosen cells in the initial global state and
then count the number of cells whose states dier in the resulting equilibrium global
state. If only ve of ten cells have new states, then the system is not very sensitive to ini-
tial conditions. If several hundred cells have dierent states, then the system is sensitive
to initial conditions. Exactly what constitutes extreme sensitivity to initial conditions is
not addressed here.
Before describing the computational experiments performed using the conformity
CA, a comment is in order about its stability. The conformity CA settles down to an
equilibrium and does so quickly. In an appendix at the end of the paper, a proof of the
convergence of the conformity CA is included.
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4.1 Observations
For the computational experiments conducted here, the initial congurations of cells
were randomly distributed with cells equally likely to be in state 1 or state 0. The
conformity map is applied to neighborhoods of size one, two and three. Table 1 shows
linearity disparity measures from fty trials on a fty by fty cellular automata for the
non{incentive based updating rules.
Table 1
Linear Disparity
Nbhd size Sync (s.d.) Async (s.d.) Incen (s.d.)
1 13.143 (0.55) 11.510 (0.59) 10.342 (0.68)
2 7.265 (0.39) 7.102 (0.40) 3.673 (0.732)
3 4.735 (0.29) 3.918 (0.31) 0.00 (0.00)
Several observations about the linear disparity under the various updating rules
can be made.
Observation 1: Linear disparity decreases as neighborhood size increases for all three
types of updating rules.
This observation has an intuitive explanation. As the neighborhood size increases
the size of the \blocks" of conformity should grow. Eventually, when the entire array
forms one neighborhood, then the only equilibrium is when all cells are in the same state.
Observation 2: Linear disparity varies only slightly between synchronous and random
asynchronous updating. Incentive based asynchronous updating creates less linear dispar-
ity.
Though the dynamics dier appreciably, there is little dierence between the
distribution of equilibrium states for synchronous and random asynchronous updating of
cells. This nding suggests further inquiry into the conditions under which the move from
synchronous to random asynchronous updating eects the distribution over end states.
In the conformity, CA the choice of updating rule, at least between these two, does not
seem to matter.
On average, incentive based asynchronous updating creates larger \blocks" of
identical states as measured by linear disparity. An explanation for this phenomenon
is that the rst cells to update tend to complete small blocks. These blocks then grow
into larger blocks. This dierence in linear disparity may have implications for empirical
studies of neighborhood eects as discussed later in this paper. The following observation
is implied by the linear disparity ndings.
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Observation 3: Incentive based updating exhibits greater variance in average state value.
The various updating rules also eect sensitivity to initial conditions.
Table 2
Sensitivity to Initial Conditions: Synchronous
# cells changed
Nbhd size One (s.d.) Two (s.d) Three (s.d) Four (s.d)
1 2.12 (0.49) 7.08 (0.89) 12.38 (1.22) 18.68 (1.48)
2 7.50 (1.38) 14.30 (1.74) 26.12 (2.70) 28.52 (2.61)
3 16.04 (3.43) 21.58 (3.19) 36.08 (4.48) 28.38 (3.50)
Table 3
Sensitivity to Initial Conditions: Random Asynchronous
# cells changed
Nbhd size One (s.d.) Two (s.d) Three (s.d) Four (s.d)
1 1.84 (0.60) 3.98 (1.02) 8.44 (1.11) 10.52 (1.28)
2 8.82 (2.97 ) 14.48 (3.23) 23.92 (4.24) 27.22 (4.64)
3 14.68 (5.17) 16.04 (5.13) 34.50 (6.72) 40.70 (7.54 )
Observation 4: Sensitivity to initial conditions increases with neighborhood size for
synchronous and random asynchronous updating.
As neighborhood size increases there are two counteracting eects. First, the
probability that a cell switches its state as a result of one cell in its neighborhood switching
decreases as there are more cells. This would decrease the sensitivity to initial conditions.
Second, the number of cells who are neighbors of a given cell increases, which increases
the sensitivity to initial conditions. This second eect dominates.
Observation 5: Random asynchronous updating exhibits similar sensitivity to initial
conditions as synchronous updating.
This suggests that random asynchronous updating does not generate greater or
less stability. Note that in the game of life, random asynchronous updating generates
much greater stability. In the data shown, the updating of cells occurred in the same
random order in each experiment. If in addition to changing a bit, the order in which
the cells update their states also changed, then there would be a massive change in the
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global state. Table 4 below shows the sensitivity to initial conditions given incentive
based asynchronous updating.
Table 4
Sensitivity to Initial Conditions: Incentive based
# cells changed
Nbhd size One (s.d.) Two (s.d) Three (s.d) Four (s.d)
1 5.82 (1.42) 11.38 (2.06) 12.54 (2.36) 16.76 (2.45)
2 32.94 (18.83) 37.46 (14.36) 77.10 (18.77) 72.04 (17.60)
Observation 6: Incentive based asynchronous updating exhibits signicantly greater sen-
sitivity to to initial conditions than synchronous updating and random asynchronous up-
dating.
The dierences in linear disparity may be a partial explanation for the increased
sensitivity to initial conditions. In many cases, changing one cell initially change a `chunk'
of cells in the nal distribution. The linear disparity measure shows that the chunks are
larger under the incentive based updating rule, which might contribute to the increased
sensitivity to initial conditions.
5 The Game of Life
As has been mentioned, with synchronous updating, the game of life creates complex
dynamics and extreme sensitivity to initial conditions, but with random asynchronous
updating these interesting dynamics disappear: the CA quickly settles into a stable
global state (Bersini and Detours 1994). Here incentive based asynchronous updating
also generates stability, though not nearly as quickly. Surprisingly, this stability does
not imply less sensitivity to initial conditions. According to the measures used, incentive
based asynchronous updating leads to even greater sensitivity to initial conditions than
synchronous updating. Some insights into why this occurs are provided later in this
section.
This section begins with a description of the game of life and then motivates
two utility from updating functions: one biased towards population growth and another
unbiased. Dierences in these utility from updating function generate predictable changes
in the dynamics of the CA. Finally, another class of updating sequencing, geographic based
asynchronous updating, is considered. Examples from two updating rules within this class
are discussed.
5.1 Description
The story behind the game of life is that if fewer than two of a cell's neighbors are live,
the cell dies from starvation, and if more than three of its neighbors are alive, the cell dies
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from suocation. In order for a cell to be come to life exactly three of the neighboring
cells must be alive.
Def'n The game of life, C
L
: N N Stimesf0; 1g ! f0; 1g according to the following
rules:
C
L
(i; j; s; 1) = 0 if
X
(k;l)2N
1
(i;j)
s
kl
62 f2; 3g
C
L
(i; j; s; 1) = 1 if
X
(k;l)2N
1
(i;j)
s
kl
2 f2; 3g
C
L
(i; j; s; 0) = 0 if
X
(k;l)2N
1
(i;j)
s
kl
6= 3
C
L
(i; j; s; 0) = 1 if
X
(k;l)2N
1
(i;j)
s
kl
= 3
Rather than just having one threshold like the conformity CA, the game of life has
two thresholds which dier depending upon the state of the cell. This more complicated
updating rule permits greater exibility in formulating a utility from updating function.
One approach is to bias the updating towards cells that were poised for birth { cells which
are dead but which have exactly three live neighbors. Other approaches are to bias the
updating toward death by making birth the lowest priority, or to balance the priorities
for births and deaths. Biasing the updating function so that cells which die update rst
leads to uninteresting dynamics. Such a rule usually generates entirely dead CAs; thus,
the analysis here is restricted to the other two approaches.
By constructing two dierent utility from updating functions, their features can
be compared. Not surprisingly, dynamics, steady states, and sensitivity to initial con-
ditions depend upon the updating function. Thus, for some classes of CA, the utility
from updating function used in incentive based updating also eects characteristics of
outcomes. An implication of this unfortunate fact is that modellers should consider mul-
tiple utility from updating functions and either report invariant outcomes or motivate
their choice of particular rule to the exclusion of others.
The two utility from updating functions rely on the fact that there are only eight
situations in which a cell has positive utility from updating: one where the cell is about
to come to life, two where the cell starves to death, and ve where the cell suocates. The
rst utility from updating function is biased in favor of dead cells which would become
alive if updating were to occur. For convenience, it is called the growth biased utility
from updating function.
Def'n The growth biased utility from updating function for the game of life, U
G
11
Utility From Updating
state # Neighs alive U
G
0 3 6
1 8 5
1 7 4
1 0 4
1 6 3
1 1 3
1 5 2
1 4 1
The other utility from updating function kills o live cells with seven or eight live
neighbors and with no live neighbors, before bringing dead cells with three neighbors to
life. It is called the unbiased utility from updating function.
Def'n The unbiased utility from updating function for the game of life, U
U
Utility From Updating
state # Neighs alive U
U
1 8 6
1 7 5
1 0 5
0 3 4
1 6 3
1 1 3
1 5 2
1 4 1
These two utility from updating functions generate quite dierent dynamics. To
see why, begin with a global state in which three live cells are arranged in a horizontal
row on a twenty cell by twenty cell CA. Denote live cells by discs and dead cells by circles.
iii
yyy
iii
Under the growth based updating rule, either of two cells could \come to life."
These two cells have been lled in the gure below:
iyi
yyy
iyi
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When either of these cells comes to life, the two cells on either side are now
poised to come to life as well. Simple calculations with pencil and paper show that this
initial conguration will lead to a huge region of entirely live cells. Under the unbiased
updating rule, the growth of live cells will be mitigated by the fact that whenever a
cell is surrounded by seven or eight live cells (which will happen quickly given this
conguration), it will die. An analysis of incentive based asynchronous updating can
now be undertaken with each of these two utility from updating functions.
5.2 Computational Analysis
As before, the CAs begin with a random distribution of live and dead cells with each
occurring with equal probability. In agreement with previous studies, here synchronous
updating leads to complex, often unstable dynamics. As linear disparity was used to
compare steady states, it is omitted in the analysis. Sensitivity to initial conditions
becomes the primary focus. Table 6 below shows the sensitivity to initial conditions for
a twenty by twenty CA which was iterated for twenty cycles.
Table 6
Sensitivity to Initial Conditions: Game of Life
# cells changed
Updating Rule One (s.d.) Two (s.d) Three (s.d) Four (s.d)
Synch. 85.22 (6.50) 99.96 (4.51) 110.92 (3.25) 109.56 (3.28)
Ran. Asy. 12.74 (1.53) 18.94 (1.92) 22.42 (1.83) 23.44 (1.76)
Growth I.B. 107.44 (5.02) 104.98 (4.75) 108.66 (5.10) 114.76 (4.62)
Unbias I.B. 102.92 (4.86) 107.32 (5.80) 115.44 (5.12) 113.92 (5.05)
With synchronous updating, if one cell changes its state, then on average a little
more than one-fth of the cells are in opposite states after twenty cycles. This is extreme
sensitivity to initial conditions. In contrast, for random asynchronous updating, if one
cell's state is changed, then on average less then twenty cells are in opposite states after
twenty cycles. Once again, random asynchronicity leads to less sensitivity to initial
conditions and to stability.
With incentive base asynchronous updating, although obtaining stability { usually
after three or four passes through the CA, the system has settled into an equilibrium { the
sensitivity to initial conditions is greater than under synchronous updating. Moreover,
this is true for each of the two utility from updating rules. Both observations merit
further attention. The rst nding suggests that all forms of asynchronous updating do
not necessarily lead to less sensitivity to initial conditions. In other words, interesting
dynamics exists. The second nding is both surprising and encouraging { surprising in
that the growth base rule did not lead to much greater sensitivity to initial conditions, and
encouraging in that the level of sensitivity is roughly invariant to the choice of updating
rule.
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An example from a ten by ten CA using the growth biased updating rule demon-
strates how the increased sensitivity to initial conditions can occur. Suppose that the
initial conguration of live cells looks as follows:
yii
iiy
iiy
The cell in the center is the unique cell which can come to life. After it comes
to life, other cells come to life and the equilibrium that obtained consists of alternating
rows of live cells as shown below:
yyyyyyyyyy
iiiiiiiiii
yyyyyyyyyy
iiiiiiiiii
yyyyyyyyyy
iiiiiiiiii
yyyyyyyyyy
iiiiiiiiii
yyyyyyyyyy
iiiiiiiiii
It is easy to see that this conguration is stable with respect to the rules of the
game of life. Changing the state of two cells in the initial conguration forms the following
conguration:
iii
yiy
iiy
In this conguration there are two cells which may come to life. Suppose that the
cell in the center of the bottom row comes to life. The next three states of the CA are
as follows:
iii iii iii
yiy yiy iyy
iyy iyy iyy
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If the center cell comes to life rst, then the population of live cells will grow
quickly. In one experiment, the CA settled into the following stable conguration:
yiyiyiyiyi
yiyiyiyiyi
yiyiyiyiyi
yiyiyiyiyi
yiyiyiyiyi
yiyiyiyiyi
yiyiyiyiyi
yiyiyiyiyi
yiyiyiyiyi
yiyiyiyiyi
This conguration disagrees with the earlier conguration of alternating rows of
live and dead cells on exactly half of the cells. Similar sorts of eects occur when starting
from random initial congurations.
6 Geographic Updating
There are a multitude of rules which the cells in a CA could use to determine the updating
order. So far, this paper has focused on random and incentive based asynchronous
updating. In some contexts, geographic based asynchronous updating, in which the
order of updating is determined by location, may be appropriate.
6
Economic examples
include cases in which the cells represent agents and the agents are arranged according
to some criterion, such as seniority or expertise as is often the case in hierarchies.
In geographic updating, cells update asynchronously according to an order which
is determined by their ranking. In this example, cells are ranked lexicographically rst
by row and then by column. The cell (1; 1) has the highest rank followed by (1; 2) and
so on through cell (n; n). Once a ranking has been established, there are at least two
ways to proceed with with updating. In each, the cells are ranked ordinally. The rst
method, iterated geographic updating, updates the highest ranked cell, then the next
highest, and so on until all cells have been updated. At that point, it begins again with
the highest ranked cell. Notice that this is dierent from an updating rule which the next
cell updated is the highest ranked cell in the `wrong' state. This second method shall be
called strict geographic updating. In this geographic ranking system, this method calls
for the cell (1; 1) to be the next cell updated whenever (1; 1) is in the wrong state.
To better understand the dierences between these two types of geographic up-
dating rules, consider a simple initial conguration and apply the game of life updating
rule. In this and other representations of the CA, a three cell by three cell section is used
to represent a much larger CA
6
One dimensional CAs where the updating is geographic often are called lter automata.
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iyi
iyi
iyi
Consider rst, the standard synchronous updating. This initial conguration cre-
ates a blinker between two global states. In the next iteration, the CA looks as follows:
iii
yyy
iii
A straightforward computation demonstrates that in the next iteration, the CA returns
to the initial global state. Therefore, the dynamic behavior is a row of live cells of length
three which alternates between a horizontal and a vertical orientation.
With iterated geographic updating, the dynamics dier. Again, begin with three
live cells arranged vertically. The cells are updated sequentially moving rst across the
CA and then down the rows. After one pass through the CA, a global state with ve live
cells is reached.
iiyi
iyyy
iyii
iiii
After a second pass through the CA, the CA is in a stable global state.
iyii
yiyi
iyii
iiii
Taking the same initial global state and applying strict geographic updating gen-
erates a dierent sequence of global states. Because there are no complete passes through
the CA with strict geographic updating, the CA is shown after each cell updating:
iyi iyi yyi
iyi yyi yyi
iyi iyi iyi
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yyi yyi yyi
yii yii yyi
iyi iii iii
After ve cell updates, the CA is in a stable global state, which is dierent from
that reached by iterated geographical updating.
7 Conclusions
This paper contains experiments with two classes of CA and demonstrates dierences
between synchronous, random asynchronous and incentive based asynchronous updat-
ing. For the conformity CA, incentive based asynchronous updating appears to bias the
distribution towards global steady states with less linear disparity. It also leads to greater
sensitivity to initial conditions. For the game of life, incentive based asynchronous updat-
ing does not induce the stability found with random asynchronous updating. In the game
of life, incentive based asynchronous updating also creates sensitivity to initial conditions
which disappears with random asynchronous updating. Though there is no formal proof
for why this occurs, one guess is that a small change in the initial conditions changes
the order in which cells are updated, which starts the system on an entirely dierent
path. Under incentive based asynchronous updating, the ordering is more deterministic
than under random asynchronous updating, therefore the divergence of paths might be
greater. But, this is all conjecture based upon watching systems evolve on the computer
screen.
While these ndings do not imply that for all updating rules that incentive based
asynchronous updating will alter relevant characteristics of the dynamical system, they
suggest that great care should be taken when dening the order in which updating takes
place. More generally, these ndings demonstrate the need to be careful in drawing
inferences about social phenomena from such simple models. In light of the analysis
presented here, others may wish to revisit existing CA models to test their susceptibility
to changing the ording of cell updating. Among the models which might merit a fresh
look is Schelling's (1978) famous tipping model of racial segregation. When considering
neighborhood eects in economic models (Durlauf 1995), whether they are endogenous
or exogenous, the role of timing of updating which might have seemed too subtle to be of
much importance should now have a more prominent role. To give just one example, in
trying to estimate the size of inuence neighborhoods in a world accurately modelled by
the conformity CA. Incentive based updating leads to much greater linearity disparity
for a given neighborhood size. This increase in linear disparity could be mistakenly
interpreted as a larger inuence neighborhood when in fact it is the result of incentive
based asynchronous updating.
This paper also suggests future experiments with asynchronous updating in which
the order is biased towards those cells with the higher utility to updating. Intuitively,
the dynamics and distributions over stable states should lie in between those generated
by random asynchronous updating and incentive based updating. Whether in fact there
is a phase transition for some levels of updating would be of particular interest.
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Appendix: Convergence of the Conformity CA
The proof that the conformity CA converges to a steady state rests on three facts:
aggregate conformity increases with each cell updating; aggregate conformity is bounded
from above; and the size of each increase is bounded from below. Together these imply
that the process of cells changing their states must stop in nite time.
7
To reduce the
amount of notation, two changes are made in the formulation of the conformity CA. First,
the state space is renormalized so that a cells now take either the state minus one or plus
one. Second, cells shall be referred to by a single variable i indexed up to m = n  n,
rather than with the coordinate pair (i; j). Let cell i's state be denoted by t
i
2 f 1; 1g,
and let the sum of the states of the cells in i's neighborhood of size  be denoted by T

i
.
Given this notation, the total conformity of the CA's state relative to the neighborhood
size can be characterized. Call it the { conformity.
Def'n The {conformity,
,

=
m
X
i=1
t
i
 T

i
The maximal {conformity equal m  (2+ 1)
2
which occurs when all m cells are
in the same state. Claim 1 states that when a cell update it increases {conformity by
an amount bounded away from zero.
Claim 1 When cell i updates its state according to the conformity updating rule given
neighborhoods of size , the {conformity increases by at least eight for any   1.
pf: Without loss of generality assume that cell i updates its state from  1 to 1, which
implies that T

i
 1. Hereafter, abbreviate T

i
as T
i
. The {conformity prior to updating
equals:
,
0

=
X
j 62N
i
t
j
 T
j
+
X
j2N
i
t
j
 T
j
+ t
i
 T
i
where N
 
i
consists of cell i's neighborhood of size  minus cell i itself. After updating
cell i the {conformity equals
,
1

= ,
0

+ 2 
X
j2N
 
i
t
j
+ 2T
i
+ 2
The dierence in {conformity, which is denoted by , can be written as:
 = 2 
X
j2N
 
i
t
j
+ 2T
i
+ 2
7
The proof presented was derived independently and is simplied as much as possible. An alternative
proof is contained in Bersini and Detours (1994)
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By construction, T
i
  t
i
=
P
j2N
 
i
t
j
, and by assumption t
i
=  1; therefore, we can
rewrite  as:
 = 2T
i
+ 2 + 2T
i
+ 2
By assumption T
i
 1, which implies   8, which completes the proof.
Given that {conformity is bounded from above, Claim 1 implies that the process
of cell updating stops. This claim can be used to prove other characteristics of the con-
formity CA. For example, a simple calculation shows the maximal number of cells which
must be updated before a stable global state is attained. Finally, note that incentive
based asynchronous updating increases the {conformity by the maximal amount given
the conguration at each time step.
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